overlapping national memberships. Each country would choose the jurisdictions to which it would belong (Eichenberger and Frey 2001) . The same principle can be applied to citizens who would be members of one or more of a variety of publicly-empowered organizations that would represent them on sub-sets of issues (Schmitter 2000) .
We propose that issues of jurisdictional design are fractal. Similar choices arise at widely differing territorial scales. The diffusion of decision making away from the central state raises fundamental issues of design that, we argue, can be conceptualized as two contrasting types of governance. We claim that these types are logically coherent, and that they represent alternative responses to fundamental problems of coordination. We conclude by arguing that these types of governance reflect distinct conceptions of community.
Islands of Theorizing
How have scholars in political science responded to the unraveling of central state control?
One intellectual response to the diffusion of authority has been to stretch established concepts over the new phenomena. Scholars of federalism have applied their approach to power sharing among as well as within states. International relations scholars are extending theories of international regimes to include diffusion of authority within states. Another response has been to create entirely new concepts, such as multi-level governance, polycentric governance, multi-perspectival governance, condominio, and fragmegration. Table 1 lists five literatures and the terms they have generated for diffusion of authority. We describe them as islands because the density of communication within each of them is much greater than that among them. governance is common currency among scholars and decision makers. 2 Multi-level governance initially described a "system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers -supranational, national, regional and local" that was distinctive of EU structural policy (Marks 1993, 392; Hooghe 1996) , but the term is now applied to the European Union more generally (e. 2 European Commission president Romano Prodi has called for "more effective multi-level governance in Europe . . . The way to achieve real dynamism, creativity and democratic legitimacy in the EU is to free the potential that exists in multi-layered levels of governance" (Prodi 2001). In its 2001 White Paper on Governance, the European Commission characterizes the European Union as one "based on multi-level governance in which each actor contributes in line with his or her capabilities or knowledge to the success of the overall exercise. In a multi-level system the real challenge is establishing clear rules for how competence is shared -not separated; only that non-exclusive vision can secure the best interests of all the Member States and all the Union's citizens" (Commission 2001, 34-35 territory and authority. John Ruggie compares the outcome to medieval rule with its patchwork of overlapping and incomplete rights (1993, 149) . James Rosenau argues that national governments are losing ground to networks of corporations, non-governmental organizations, professional societies, advocacy groups, alongside governments. These "spheres of authority" ensure compliance but they are non-hierarchical, fluid, mostly nongovernmental, and often non-territorial (Rosenau 1997).
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An extensive literature on federalism examines the optimal allocation of authority across multiple tiers of government and how governments at different levels interact. An appreciation of the benefits of decentralization -summarized by Wallace Oates'
Decentralization Theorem -underlies much of this literature (1999, 1122 seen as an alternative but rather as a complement to intergovernmental relations defined in a regulatory framework" (forthcoming, 2-3). One criticism of centralized government is that it is insensitive to varying scale efficiencies from policy to policy. Economies of scale are more likely to characterize the production of capital-intensive public goods than of labor-intensive services because economies accrue from spreading costs over larger outputs (Oakerson 1999) . So economies of scale in military defense and physical infrastructure are far greater than in education. Large-scale jurisdictions make sense for the former; small-scale jurisdictions for the latter.
Flexible Governance
Efficiency requires that a policy's full effects -positive and negative -be internalized in decision making. Externalities arising from a policy to impede global warming encompass the entire planet, but those involving waste management, water quality control, nature preservation, or urban planning, for example, are local or regional. Under multi-level governance, jurisdictions can be custom-designed with such variation in mind.
Centralized government is not well suited to accommodate diversity. Ecological conditions may vary from area to area. Controlling smog in a low lying flat area surrounded by hills (such as Los Angeles) poses a very different policy problem than smog control in a high plateau such as Denver. Preferences of citizens may also vary sharply across regions within a state, and if one takes such heterogeneity into account, the optimal level of authority may be lower than economies of scale dictate. In short, multi-level governance allows decision makers to adjust the scale of governance to reflect heterogeneity. 
Two Types
Beyond the bedrock agreement that flexible governance must be multi-level, there is no consensus about how multi-level governance should be structured.
Should jurisdictions be designed around particular communities, or should they be designed around particular policy problems?
4 Other hypothesized benefits of multi-level governance are that it provides more complete information of constituents' preferences, is more adaptive in response to changing preferences, is more open to experimentation and innovation, and that it facilitates credible commitments (Majone 1998; Weingast 1995).
Costs of multi-level governance are seen to arise from incomplete information, inter-jurisdictional coordination, interest group capture, and corruption (Foster 1997; Gray 1973; Lowery et al. 1995; Cai and Treisman 2001) . Should jurisdictions bundle competencies, or should they be functionally specific? -Should jurisdictions be limited in number, or should they proliferate? -Should jurisdictions be designed to last, or should they be fluid?
Do answers to these questions hang together coherently? Can one conceptualize logically coherent types that capture alternative jurisdictional arrangements?
We attempt to do this in the remainder of this article. Table 2 sets out types of multi-level governance drawn from the literatures described above. We label them simply as Type I and Type II. 5 The first two attributes in the table concern variation among individual jurisdictions; the final two describe systemic properties. Type I multi-level governance describes jurisdictions at a limited number of levels. These jurisdictions -international, national, regional, meso, local -are general-purpose. That is to say, they bundle together multiple functions, including a range of policy responsibilities, and in many cases, a court system and representative institutions. The membership boundaries of such jurisdictions do not intersect. This is the case for jurisdictions at any one level, and it is the case for jurisdictions across levels. In Type I governance, every citizen is located in a Russian Doll set of nested jurisdictions, where there is one and only one relevant jurisdiction at any particular territorial scale. Territorial jurisdictions are intended to be, and usually are, stable for periods of several decades or more, though the allocation of policy competencies across jurisdictional levels is flexible.
Type II multi-level governance is distinctly different. It is composed of s pecialized jurisdictions. Type II governance is fragmented into functionally specific pieces -say, providing a particular local service, solving a particular common resource problem, selecting a particular software standard, monitoring water quality of a particular river, or adjudicating international trade disputes. The number of such jurisdictions is potentially huge, and the scales at which they operate vary finely. There is no great fixity in their existence. They tend to be lean and flexible -they come and go as demands for governance change.
In the following section we set out a functional argument explaining why these types co-exist.
But first, we describe them in more detail and ground them in their respective literatures.
Type I governance
The intellectual foundation for Type I governance is federalism, which is concerned with power sharing among a limited number of governments operating at just a few levels.
Federalism is chiefly concerned with the relationship between central government and a tier of non-intersecting sub-national governments. The unit of analysis is the individual government, rather than the individual policy. In the words of Wallace Oates, dean of fiscal federalism, "the traditional theory of fiscal federalism lays out a general normative framework for the assignment of functions to different levels of government and the appropriate fiscal instruments for carrying out these functions" (1999, 1121) . The framework is system-wide; the functions are bundled; and the levels of government are multiple but limited in number.
Type I governance shares these basic characteristics, but does not necessarily exist only within individual states. We discuss these characteristics in turn.
General-purpose jurisdictions. Decision-making powers are dispersed across jurisdictions, but bundled in a small number of packages. Federalists and students of intergovernmental relations tend to emphasize the costs of decomposing authority into disparate packages.
This idea is especially strong in Europe where local government usually exercises "a wide spread of functions, reflecting the concept of general-purpose local authorities exercising comprehensive care for their communities" (Norton 1991, 22 governance. In modern democracies, Type I jurisdictions usually adopt the trias politicas structure of an elected legislature, an executive (with a professional civil service), and a court system. As one moves from smaller to larger jurisdictions, the institutions become more elaborate but the basic structure is similar. Though the institutions of the US federal government are far more complex than those of a French town, they resemble each other more than they do the Type II arrangements described below.
Type I jurisdictions are durable. Jurisdictional reform -that is, creating, abolishing, or radically adjusting new jurisdictions -is costly and unusual. Such change normally consists of re-allocating policy functions across existing levels of governance. The institutions responsible for governance are sticky, and they tend to outlive the conditions that brought them into being.
Type II governance
An alternative form of multi-level governance is one in which the number of jurisdictions is potentially vast, rather than limited; in which jurisdictions are not aligned on just a few levels, but operate at numerous territorial scales; in which jurisdictions are task-specific rather than general-purpose; and where jurisdictions are intended to be flexible rather than durable. This conception is predominant among neoclassical political economists and public choice 7 Other examples of non-territorial Type I governance are the clan system in Somalia, communal self-governance in the Ottoman empire, and religious self-governance in India. 8 There are a few exceptions. For example, Greenland and the Faeroe Islands, self-governing parts of Denmark, are not members of the European Union.
theorists, but it also summarizes the ideas of several scholars of federalism, local government, international relations, and European studies.
Task-specific jurisdictions. In Type II governance, multiple, independent jurisdictions fulfill distinct functions. This leads to a governance system where "each citizen . . . is served not by 'the' government, but by a variety of different public service industries. . . . We can then think of the public sector as being composed of many public service industries including the police industry, the fire protection industry, the welfare industry, the health services industry, the transportation industry, and so on" (Ostrom and Ostrom 1999, 88-89 Delaware and New Jersey), the Chicago Gary Regional Airport Authority (involving Chicago, Illinois and Gary, Indiana), or the Port Authority between New York and New Jersey; nor do they include independent school districts, of which there were in 2002 over 13,500 (U.S.
Bureau of the Census 1999, 2002).
Intersecting memberships. "There is generally no reason why the smaller jurisdictions should be neatly contained within the borders of the larger ones. On the contrary, borders will be crossed, and jurisdictions will partly overlap. The 'nested,' hierarchical structure of the nationstate has no obvious economic rationale and is opposed by economic forces" (Casella and Weingast 1995, 13).
I H S -Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks / Unraveling the Central State, But How? -11
Frey and Eichenberger coin the acronym FOCJ (functional, overlapping, and competing jurisdictions) for this form of governance (1999). "Polycentricity" was initially used to describe metropolitan governance in the United States, which has historically been considerably more fragmented than in Europe. It is now applied by Elinor and Vincent Ostrom as a generic term for the co-existence of "many centers of decision-making that are formally independent of each other" (Ostrom, Tiebout, Warren 1961, 831) . In the context of the European Union, Philippe Schmitter uses the term condominio to describe "dispersed overlapping domains"
having "incongruent memberships" that "act autonomously to solve common problems and produce different public goods" (1996, 136).
Type II governance has the following systemic characteristics:
Many jurisdictional levels. Type II governance is organized across a large number of levels.
Instead of conceiving authority in neatly defined local, regional, national, and international layers, public choice students argue that each public good or service should be provided by the jurisdiction that effectively internalizes its benefits and costs. The result is jurisdictions at diverse scales -something akin to a marble cake. Students of Type II governance generally speak of multi-or poly-centered governance, which, they feel, have less a ring of hierarchy to them than the terms multi-level or multi-tiered governance.
One area where one finds a multiplicity of Type II jurisdictions is in densely populated frontier 
The Coordination Dilemma
The chief benefit of multi-level governance lies in its scale flexibility. Its chief cost lies in the transaction costs of coordinating multiple jurisdictions. The coordination dilemma confronting multi-level governance can be simply stated: To the extent that policies of one jurisdiction have spillovers (i.e. negative or positive externalities) for other jurisdictions, so coordination is necessary to avoid socially perverse outcomes. We conceive this as a second-order coordination problem because it involves coordination among institutions whose primary function is to coordinate human activity.
Second-order coordination costs increase exponentially as the number of relevant jurisdictions increases. Fritz Scharpf has probed the conditions of interjurisdictional coordination, and it seems to us fitting to describe this basic dilemma as Scharpf's law: "As the number of affected parties increases . . . negotiated solutions incur exponentially rising and eventually prohibitive transaction costs" (1997, 70).
The simplest way to understand this is to think through the impact of increasing numbers of players in an iterated prisoners' dilemma. A two-player iterated game provides certainty of repeated interaction, and this permits strategies based on tit for tat to effectively punish defection. As the number of actors rises, it becomes harder to punish defectors. Free riding is the dominant strategy for large groups in the absence of a leviathan or of countervailing norms that can induce actors to monitor and punish defection. This is, in a nutshell, the coordination dilemma of multi-level governance.
How can multi-level governance deal with the coordination dilemma? One strategy is to limit the number of autonomous actors who have to be coordinated by limiting the number of autonomous jurisdictions. The second is to limit interaction among actors by splicing competencies into functionally distinct units.
The first strategy underpins Type I governance. Type I governance describes a limited number of multi-task, general-purpose jurisdictions with non-intersecting borders. By bundling competencies together, Type I governance gains the benefits of varying territorial scale while minimizing the number of jurisdictions that have to be coordinated. Type I governance is bundled multi-level governance.
Type I governance constrains the number of jurisdictions according to the following design principles:
Non-intersecting memberships. Jurisdictional memberships at the same territorial level do not overlap. Non-intersecting membership limits the need for jurisdictional coordination horizontally at any level and, vertically, across levels.
Cascading jurisdictional scale. The territorial scale of jurisdiction decreases sharply across levels. European Union countries have between two and five subnational levels, described by the European Commission in terms of a common rubric, the Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques (NUTS) (Eurostat 1999, 27) . The median population represented in the first level, NUTS 1 jurisdictions, is 3.89 million;
that in the second level, NUTS 2 jurisdictions, is 1.42 million; NUTS 3 jurisdictions have a median population of 369,000; the median population in NUTS 4 is 48,000, and at the lowest level, NUTS 5, it is 5,100. In the United States, the corresponding median population for states is 3.76 million, for counties, 69,600, and for subcounties, 8,800.
Cascading jurisdictional scale spreads governance across vastly different scales, but limits the total number of subnational levels to three, four, or at most, five tiers.
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General-purpose jurisdictions. A logical corollary is that authoritative competencies are bundled into a small number of extensive packages at each level. Type I governance disperses authority across widely different levels, and constrains the number of levels by making the jurisdictions at each level multi-purpose.
System-wide architecture. The pyramidal structure of Type I governance lends itself to hierarchical direction. Most Type I governance systems are bound together by a single court system with ultimate authority to adjudicate among contending jurisdictions.
The alternative approach is to limit coordination costs by constraining interaction across jurisdictions. Type II governance sets no ceiling on the number of jurisdictions, but spawns new ones along functionally differentiated lines. As a result, externalities across jurisdictions are minimized. This is an exact corollary to Herbert Simon's notion of "nearly decomposable"
structures (1996, 178) . Simon argues that tasks within an organization should be distributed so that the share of internal interactions within constituent units is maximized and the share of external interactions minimized. The idea, applied to jurisdictional design, is to distribute tasks so that the short-run behavior of actors across different jurisdictions is more or less independent from that of others, while their long-run behavior is connected only in the aggregate. Flexible, policy-specific architecture. Type II governance is designed with respect to particular policy problems -not particular communities or constituencies. Institutional design -the scope of a jurisdiction, its mode of decision making, adjudication, and implementation -can thus be adapted to particular policy problems.
The gist of this line of thinking is that Type I and Type II governance are good at different things, and co-exist because they are complementary. The result is a fluctuating number of relatively self-contained, functionally differentiated Type II jurisdictions alongside a more stable population of general-purpose, nested Type I jurisdictions.
Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Community
Yet Type I and Type II governance are not merely different means to the same end. They embody contrasting conceptions of community. Type I jurisdictions are usually based on encompassing communities. Such communities are often territorial, but they may also be based on membership of a particular religious or ethnic group. In either case, the jurisdiction satisfies a preference for collective self-government, a good that is independent of citizens' preferences for efficiency or for any particular policy output. membership is voluntary, and one can be a member of several such groups. They are akin to the optimal jurisdictions described by Martin McGuire, generated by "common advantages people may find in producing, exchanging, or consuming some good which they value" (1974, 132) . Membership in such functional communities is extrinsic; it encompasses merely one aspect of an individual's identity.
Many Type II jurisdictions facilitate entry and exit in order to create a market for the production and consumption of a public good. Most do not seek to resolve fundamental disagreements by deliberation, but instead avoid them altogether by allowing individuals to 
Conclusion
Political science has had far more to say about how collective decisions can and should be made than about for whom they can and should be made. We make no claim to originality. The types we describe are distilled from research in local government, federalism, European integration, international relations, and public policy. Type I and Type II governance arise -under different guises and with different labels -as fundamental alternatives in each of these fields. Specialists will surely wish to make finer distinctions than the ones we draw. There is an extensive literature on variation within each type. Our belief is that a logically consistent schema setting out basic institutional options can help situate one's work in a larger intellectual enterprise. In the process, we hope we raise in the reader's mind many more questions than we can possibly answer. How do these types co-exist? What are their dynamic properties? How is democracy limited or enabled in each institutional set-up?
The types of governance that we conceive share one vital feature: they are radical departures from the centralized state. However, they diffuse authority in contrasting ways.
The first type of governance -we label this Type I -bundles competencies in jurisdictions at a limited number of territorial levels. These jurisdictions form part of a system-wide plan: they are mutually exclusive at each territorial level, and the units at each level are perfectly nested within those at the next higher level. Jurisdictional design generally corresponds to communal identities: each jurisdiction caters to an encompassing group or territorial community. These jurisdictions are oriented to voice rather than to exit. Type I governance reflects a simple design principle: maximize the fit between the scale of a jurisdiction and the optimal scale of public good provision while minimizing inter-jurisdictional coordination by a)
11 Not always though. In Governing the Commons Elinor Ostrom (1990) describes several common pool resource arrangements with deliberative-democratic decision making. As Ostrom observes, such jurisdictions tend to become magnets for solving a wide range of community problems. Once such institutions are in place, it may be more efficient to add governance functions to an existing jurisdiction than to create a new one. Democratic accountability of task-specific regimes is also discussed in international relations (e.g. Nye and Donahue 2000; Skogstad 2001).
creating inclusive jurisdictions that internalize most relevant externalities and b) limiting the number of jurisdictional levels.
Type II governance also limits the transaction costs of inter-jurisdictional coordination, but it does so in a fundamentally different way, by splicing public good provision into a large number of functionally discrete jurisdictions. But these jurisdictions do not conform to an overarching blueprint. Rather, each is designed to address a limited set of related problems.
Type II jurisdictions are task-driven. Hence, the same individual may be part of several overlapping and intersecting jurisdictions. Membership in Type II jurisdictions tends to be conditional and extrinsic. Type II jurisdictions are often designed to have low barriers to entry and exit so as to engender competition among them.
As we conceptualize them here, these forms of governance represent very different ways of organizing political life. Type I governance is non-intersecting from the standpoint of membership; type II governance is non-intersecting from the standpoint of tasks. The former is designed around human (usually territorial) community; the latter is designed around particular tasks or policy problems. The development of multi-level governance is commonly
